The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law and Economics by Rachlinski, Jeffrey J.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2011
The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law
and Economics
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cornell Law School, rachlins@law.mail.cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Legal
Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rachlinski, Jeffrey J., "The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral Law and Economics" (2011). Cornell Law Faculty Publications.
Paper 829.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/829
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski*
Over the past decade, psychological research has enjoyed a rap-
idly expanding influence on legal scholarship. This expansion has es-
tablished a new field- "Behavioral Law and Economics" (BLE).
BLE's principal insight is that human behavior commonly deviates
from the predictions of rational choice theory in the marketplace, the
election booth, and the courtroom. Because these deviations are pre-
dictable, and often harmful, legal rules can be crafted to reduce their
undesirable influence. Ironically, BLE seldom recognizes that its in-
tellectual origins lie with psychology more so than economics. This
failure leaves BLE open to criticisms that can be answered only by
embracing the underlying psychological foundation of the field. Em-
bracing psychology is harder than it seems, however, because psy-
chology meshes much less easily with law than does economics. Con-
sequently, BLE has yet to fully realize its potential and might never
successfully do so.
I. INTRODUCTION
Never has law relied as heavily on psychology as it does today. Law
has consistently consumed a steady diet of research from psychology on
juries, on the mentally ill, and on witness credibility for many decades.
As of the mid-1990s, one could find only a small scattershot of articles
that applied psychology to law that in any way expanded on these tradi-
tional topics. The reach of psychology, however, has expanded dramat-
ically in the last fifteen years. This period witnessed the publication of a
series of articles that began to apply the psychology of judgment and
choice to legal concepts. Notable among these is an article by Tom Ulen
and Russell Korobkin in 2000,' which, along with a piece by Christine
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ration-
ality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
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Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler (JST), 2 helped launch the new
discipline.
The field has come a long way. I recall having a drink with Tom
Ulen, Russell Korobkin, and a political scientist in 1999 at a conference
in New York City. The political scientist asked Tom how many scholars
were applying the psychology of judgment and choice to law. Tom re-
plied that if a grenade went off at the table, it would destroy most of the
field (along with our beverages). He was doubtless being kind to two ju-
nior colleagues, as several others were then hard at work creating the
foundations for the field. But over time, behavioral law and economics
(BLE) has expanded to include many scholars and to cover many areas.
Despite its strengths, criticisms and limitations continue to dog
BLE.3 In this Article, I argue that one of the field's surprising weak-
nesses-the failure to recognize the psychological origins of the field-
would enable it to address its critics and to expand its horizons. Embrac-
ing BLE's underlying reliance on psychological rather than economic
principles would give the field a much more stable foundation. Doing so,
however, would require embracing theories of human behavior that are
not only inconsistent with economic principles but also with the implicit
understanding of human behavior that our legal system embraces. Much
of the success that economics has attained arises from the ease with
which its principles mesh with how judges, regulators, and legislatures
tend to think about how people respond to legal rules. By using econom-
ics as a platform for introducing psychological concepts to law, BLE has
enjoyed some success as well. But this reliance on economics also has
required compromise, created opportunities for critics, and limited the
scope of the field.
In this Article, I proceed as follows. Part II begins by identifying
the intellectual origins and accomplishments of BLE. Part III identifies
some of the major criticisms of the field and shows how relying more
closely on the psychological origins of the field would address these prin-
ciples. Part IV identifies some challenges of embracing these principles.
Part V concludes.
2. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV 1471 (1998).
3. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skep-
tics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000) (reviewing and responding to some ba-
sic criticisms).
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II. THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF BLE
One of the curious aspects of BLE is that although its intellectual
origins lie in psychology, its name implies that it is rooted entirely in eco-
nomics. The moniker "BLE" arises from its attachment to "law and eco-
nomics," not from its methodological commitments. But as I discuss in
this Part, the intellectual history of the field lies firmly within psychology,
not economics. The field is thus, at heart, an intellectual mongrel.
If the founding papers of BLE are those of Korobkin and Ulen and
JST, then the intellectual forefathers are clearly Amos Tversky and Dan-
iel Kahneman. Tversky and Kahneman developed most of the social
science research that Korobkin and Ulen and JST relied on in their pa-
pers.4 The first BLE scholarship is thus an extension of Tversky and
Kahneman's work, and their work continues to provide the foundation
upon which the field rests. For example, Ward Farnsworth's fine, recent
book, which outlines social science research for lawyers, includes five
chapters on BLE (discussing the endowment effect, framing, anchoring,
hindsight bias, and self-serving bias), four of which describe concepts that
Tversky and Kahneman developed (self-serving bias is the exception, al-
though Tversky worked on a similar phenomenon-overconfidence).'
Tversky and Kahneman's methods are thus the methods BLE uses.
When Tversky and Kahneman first began to develop their paradigm
for studying judgment and choices -commonly called the "heuristics and
biases" paradigm-they explicitly copied the methods used by the cogni-
tive psychologists of their time.6 Cognitive psychologists then (and most-
ly now) used apparent imperfections in perception and memory to craft
models outlining how perception and memory function. For example, to
demonstrate that people rely on the ease of recall as a cue to estimating
frequency-known as "availability" -Tversky and Kahneman gave sub-
jects two lists of names to memorize. One list contained male names that
were mostly celebrities and female names that were not. Even though
the number of male and female names on the lists was identical, subjects
misremembered that there were more male names on the list.7 They ob-
tained the opposite result when they used female celebrity names and
ordinary male names.' The bias in judgment that reliance on cognitive
4. Much of this work is documented in a 1982 edited collection, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). The first paper to out-
line the "heuristics and biases" approach underlying this work was Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahne-
man, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974), reprinted in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra at 3.
5. WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW
209-46 (2007). Farnsworth's book itself reflects one of Tom Ulen's ideas. Tom once told me that he
believed that every lawyer should be aware of certain classic ideas in social science, including psychol-
ogy. This is the premise of Fransworth's book. See id.
6. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL.
REv. 582, 583-84 (1996) (describing the development of the heuristics and biases paradigm).
7. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1127.
8. Id.
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availability produces holds inherent interest for psychology theory and
raises practical concerns about how lay people make judgments. But the
biases and errors are actually meant to uncover the cognitive mechan-
isms that people rely on when making such judgments. Cognitive psy-
chology, more so than any economic concept, thus lies at the heart of
BLE.
It is thus a great anomaly that "BLE" is not simply "Cognitive Psy-
chology and Law." To be sure, incorporating the broader term "be-
havioral" usefully expands the field. Tversky, Kahneman, their students,
and other psychologists are not responsible for all of the phenomena that
provide the grist for the BLE mill.' Economists such as Dick Thaler,
George Loewenstein, and Colin Camerer (among others) have done
work that is of enormous value to BLE.o BLE represents a combination
of both the work of psychologists in the heuristics and biases tradition
started by Tversky and Kahneman and the work by this group of econo-
mists.
That said, the addition of this body of work still does not make the
field a true subset of economics. Thaler, Loewenstein, and Camerer
might deny it, but they are really psychologists. They write and think
like people who are interested in the prediction and control of individual
thought and behavior. For example, Richard Thaler's description of the
"endowment effect" is a psychological account." He sensed that selling
even the most ordinary item simply feels different than buying it. 2 Simi-
larly, a study of taxi drivers in New York by Colin Camerer and George
Loewenstein (among others) shows that drivers are remarkably insensi-
tive to economic concepts like opportunity costs in deciding when to
work. 3 Rather, the behavior of taxi drivers follows a model of mental
accounting suggested in Tversky and Kahneman's work. These re-
searchers also spent many years studying concepts that are largely for-
eign to economics, such as norms and fairness.14
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that these researchers are re-
ally psychologists is that several of them have begun conducting research
using functional magnetic resonance imaging scans of the brain. Al-
though a new field known as "neuroeconomics" has emerged from this
work, assessing how the brain functions has been the primary goal of
9. Dick Thaler is, of course, the third author of the foundational piece by JST. See supra note 2.
10. Loewenstein and Camerer also coauthored an important contribution to the BLE literature
on paternalism, as well as being leaders of behavioral economics. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1211 (2003).
11. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
39, 43-47 (1980) (describing the endowment effect for the first time).
12. See id. at 44-47.
13. See Colin Camerer et al., Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time,
112 Q.J. EcoN. 407,412-33 (1997).
14. For a summary of much of this work, see COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY:
EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION (2003).
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cognitive psychology from the outset." The human mind, rather than the
market, is at the core of the work that this group of behavioral economics
has done that has in turn been incorporated into BLE.
Furthermore, BLE tends not to rely on the work of other strains of
behavioral economics that do not incorporate psychological concepts so
readily. It is useful to remember that the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics
was shared by Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith. Smith is clearly an
economist to the core (meaning no disrespect). He developed his own
research paradigm with the goal of bringing markets and incentives into
the laboratory, where they could be controlled and studied with experi-
mental techniques. 6 This work has proven fruitful and productive, but it
is not psychology. Smith and his colleagues are interested in how mar-
kets and incentives function, whereas psychologists are engaged in an ef-
fort to assess how people reason and think. The research that Vernon
Smith and similar scholars have produced, however, is only rarely cited
within behavioral law and economics." Rather, the work of the econo-
mists who think more like psychologists, such as Richard Thaler, Colin
Camerer, and George Loewenstein, is more prevalent.'
Even though BLE arises from an incorporation of psychological
principles into law, the field hides the psychological aspects of the under-
lying research. Even though most scholars in the field do not call their
work "psychology," instead preferring the "behavioral" moniker, they
are likely using the word "behavioral" as a substitute for "psychological."
Most papers in the field identify a well-developed cognitive or social
process or phenomena and explore their potential implications in some
area of law or policy. 9 The field, nevertheless, has been marketed as a
subset of law and economics, rather than an extension of psychological
research.
Identifying BLE as an application of economics to law, rather than
as an application of psychology to law, has doubtless been a good mar-
keting strategy. After all, even though both economics and psychology
provide theories of how humans behave, economics has historically pene-
trated far deeper into the law than psychology. Economics has touched
almost every subject in the law school curriculum, while the applications
of psychology are relegated largely to mental health law, jury decision
15. See Colin Camerer, Neuroeconomics: What Is Neuroeconomics?, CAL. INST. TECH., http://
www.hss.caltech.edu/-camerer/web-material/n.html (last visited July 28,2011).
16. See Vernon L. Smith, Autobiography, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel
prizes/economics/laureates/2002/smith-autobio.html (last visited July 28, 2011).
17. There are exceptions of course. Matt McCubbins and others frequently attend (and even
have organized) the annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies.
18. A search of Westlaw's JLR database conducted on July 1, 2011, revealed 1535 citations to
Richard Thaler, 765 to George Loewenstein, and 523 to Colin Camerer. A search for Vernon Smith
revealed 392 citations (some with false positives, given the common name). All searches were con-
ducted with the person's last name within two words of their first.
19. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 740 (noting that the underlying behavioral decision
theory research "relies upon inferences that psychologists make about cognitive processes").
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making, and witness credibility (especially eyewitnesses). BLE has thus
hitched its wagon to a proven star, with positive results. The early pa-
pers, particularly those by Korobkin and Ulen and JST, provided a
roadmap for hundreds of articles that followed their suggestion of mak-
ing psychological phenomenon a critical part of legal analysis. Within a
few years an edited collection of articles appeared, applying psychology
to basic principles of contracts, torts, property, tax, securities regulation,
and others. 20 Today, legal scholarship routinely includes articles with
titles ranging from Cap and Trade: A Behavioral Analysis of the Sulfur
Dioxide Emissions Market21 to A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lend-
ing.22 An attempt to summarize the progress of BLE in 2003 filled a
symposium volume of the Northwestern University Law Review and cited
well over a thousand uses of the psychology of judgment and choice in
legal scholarship that address subjects well beyond the traditional areas
in which psychology has had its influence.2 3
The establishment of a novel platform for the incorporation of psy-
chological research into law represents a real achievement. Although
some have criticized BLE as consisting of scattershot and theoretically
unbounded observations,24 its principal insights can be summarized in a
few simple sentences, each of which has produced a huge volume of
scholarship:
(1) Because consumers can make consistent errors in judgment, a
free market cannot entirely be trusted to produce an efficient al-
location of goods and services. This observation arguably sup-
ports a whole range of interventions into the marketplace, from
labeling laws to the imposition of strict liability in products liabil-
ity.25
(2) Because voters rely on simplistic decision-making strategies, the
political process can direct public officials toward unwise policy
judgments. This line of work suggests that risk regulation is best
done by expert agencies insulated from political influence. 26
(3) Decision making by judges and juries is frequently inaccurate in
ways that can distort the civil and criminal justice systems. Pro-
cedural rules governing dispute resolution are, or should be, de-
signed to prevent systematic errors in judgment from determin-
20. BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
21. Jacob Kreutzer, Cap and Trade: A Behavioral Analysis of the Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Mar-
ket, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 125 (2006).
22. Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725(2005).
23. Symposium, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Hu-
man Behavior, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1075 (2003).
24. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 748-52 (describing this criticism and responding).
25. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1165, 1178-95 (2003) (reviewing these applications).
26. See id. at 1202-06 (reviewing these applications).
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ing the outcome of adjudication." Jury decision making is tradi-
tionally an area in which psychology has had influence, but BLE
has added several new dimensions to this line of research.
(4) People are both more altruistic and vindictive than rational mod-
els of behavior predict. This observation has several implications
for how societies might function well or function poorly.28 This
observation has implications for understanding how social norms
govern behavior more so than legal rules and for understanding
the attractiveness of legal rules that promote altruistic norms.
In its short history, BLE has thus accomplished a great deal. Its ob-
servations are now standard fare for legal scholars who contemplate the
regulation of the marketplace, elections, courts, and society in general. It
has shifted the paradigm for a number of areas of law, which now cannot
reasonably be taught quite the same way. Legal scholars familiar with
BLE now think differently about consumers, judges, juries, and voters.
III. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES
Not surprisingly for a field that has become so influential, BLE has
also attracted its share of critics. From the outset, predictable attacks
have come from scholars in old school law and economics, and they per-
sist.2 9 But even more open-minded law and economics scholars have ex-
pressed concerns. 0 Doctrinal legal scholars have also expressed skepti-
cism,31 and some members of the law and society movement have joined
in as well.32 Perhaps the most surprising attack is from a psychologist.33
Concerns about BLE take several different forms and summarizing
them necessarily provides an incomplete account. The persistent con-
cerns can be lumped into three basic categories: (1) the underlying phe-
nomena BLE relies upon are laboratory artifacts, which neglect an un-
derlying higher-order rationality; (2) the work lacks a coherent
underlying theory, thereby leading to inconsistent reform proposals; and
(3) incentives and institutions weed out cognitive errors in important set-
27. See id. at 1196-1202.
28. Professor Lynn Stout reviews this aspect of BLE in a recent book. See LYNN STOUT,
CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 15-22 (2011).
29. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1551, 1551-52 (1998); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603,1603-08 (2000).
30. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1776-87 (1998) (discussing the debate on the meaning of behavioral decision
theory for law and economics); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Econom-
ics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749-53 (1998) (same).
31. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis:
The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 717-19 (2000).
32. See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Be-
havioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 L. & SOC'Y REV. 973, 973-78 (2000).
33. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002).
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tings. Because similar concerns have also been raised about the psychol-
ogy and behavioral economics on which BLE relies, the responses that
these fields have already provided will largely address the basic concerns.
Most of the criticisms are also the kinds of concerns that economists
would raise, and each of them requires psychology to address.
A. The Phenomena on Which BLE Relies Are Real
Criticisms about the reality of the cognitive phenomena on which
BLE relies take a number of different forms, but they tend to follow two
different strands. First, the supposed mistakes in judgment are not ac-
tually mistakes. Second, the mistakes result from the highly artificial lab
setting, and people are far more rational in realistic settings.
1. The Mistakes Are Not Mistakes
Are mistakes that subjects supposedly commit in the lab truly mis-
takes, or are the subjects simply interpreting the questions researchers
ask in a different way than the researchers suppose they have understood
them? This concern is critical because BLE relies, at its core, on the con-
cept that people make predictable errors in judgment.
The critique that supposed mistakes are not actually mistakes is best
assessed through the discussions regarding the problem of "Linda the
Bank Teller." 34 The problem describes a politically active Berkeley hu-
manities graduate named Linda. The researchers ask subjects whether
Linda is more likely to be a "bank teller" or a "bank teller [who] is active
in the feminist movement." 35 Most people say the latter, even though it is
a logical subset of the former (and hence must be less likely). 36 When
Tversky and Kahneman termed this choice an error in judgment, critics
cried foul. They claimed that the natural way to interpret a question of
that form is to assume that the inclusion of the latter term modifies the
first term implicitly to mean "bank teller who is not a feminist." If so, the
latter would be a defensible interpretation. Critics also show that chang-
ing the choice to ensure that the subjects understand the problem (that
is, changing the first choice to "is a bank teller whether or not she is a
feminist") dramatically reduces the proportion of subjects who commit
the supposed error.
These criticisms, however, misunderstand the underlying purpose
and interpretation of the original study. Tversky and Kahneman certain-
ly did accuse their subjects of committing a transparent deviation from
deductive logic, but the point of the study was to show how people rea-
34. The "Linda" problem, the critique identified herein, and the reply discussed above are re-
viewed in Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunc-
tion Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 299 (1983).
35. Id.
36. See id.
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son about categories. Tversky and Kahneman asserted that providing
extra cues to link an individual to a category makes it seem more likely
that the person is a member of that category (that is, they use the "repre-
sentativeness" heuristic).37 Thus, changing the statement of the problem
changes the problem in a way that is too fundamental to make for a co-
herent test of whether their interpretation is correct. When researchers
add the phrase, "is a bank teller regardless of whether or not she is a fe-
minist," they have converted the problem from one that would inspire
people to rely on representativeness to one that is transparently about
the use of set theory and deductive logic."
The Linda problem, in fact, is open to multiple interpretations,
making it a flawed problem. Variations on the problem, however, also
reveal that Tversky and Kahneman accurately described how people
make judgments under these circumstances. "Between subject" varia-
tions of the Linda problem, in which subjects view one of two versions of
a problem, support the theory that people rely on the representativeness
heuristics in making categorical judgments. For example, a group of ex-
pert forecasters assigned higher probability estimates for the likelihood
that "a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA
and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" than they did to "a Russian in-
vasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations be-
tween the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.""l The underly-
ing event itself seems unlikely, and so adding the details that would
facilitate the event makes the possibility more cognitively accessible, and
thus seem more likely. Although such "between subject" designs have
their critics too, other work shows that people who tend to think more
deductively commit the supposed mistake in the Linda problem less than
more intuitive people. 40 If the subjects are engaged in the kind of recon-
struction of the problem that the critics suggest, then the opposite should
be the case.
More importantly, the point of the study is not to demonstrate that
people make mistakes, it is to identify what cognitive process people rely
on when making categorical judgments. The supposed flaw in the Linda
problem thus does not represent a condemnation of the study, but the
proposition that an alternative cognitive process is at play. The interpre-
tation that critics favor suggests that people comport with the norms of
rational choice and deductive logic, whereas the interpretation Tversky
and Kahneman favored suggests that people do not always rely on de-
37. See id. at 299-300.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 307.
40. See, e.g., Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Impli-
cations for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 421, 434 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (describing a study showing that "the mean
SAT score of the 121 subjects who committed the conjunction fallacy was 82 points lower than the
mean score of the 29 who avoided the fallacy").
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ductive logic when making such choices. Nevertheless, the problem was
not designed as a means of debating human rationality. The problem
was meant to illustrate the reliance on a particular cognitive mechanism.
Criticism sharpened the underlying point, forcing the researchers to use a
more precise method of illustrating the phenomenon, but the criticism
does not undermine the theory that human beings rely on cognitive
processes that can produce errors in judgment.
Debate over the meaning of the Linda problem illustrates how
BLE's ties to law and economics can harm the field. BLE scholars com-
monly argue that representativeness leads to irrational and destructive
judgments that can be remedied.41 Scholars treat representativeness as
form of market failure, thereby implicitly embracing and extending the
methods of economics. This kind of analysis creates a mistaken focus on
mistakes in judgment.42 The emphasis on mistakes means that any dem-
onstration that human choice is actually consistent with rational choice
threatens to undermine the value of BLE. The merits of BLE, however,
should instead depend on the use of a particular method of assessing and
studying human judgment. BLE should not consist solely of an effort to
identify and correct mistakes, but instead should consist of an effort to
understand how law can best interact with the cognitive processes that
produce human judgment and choice.
2. Ecological Rationality
The criticism that people are not actually making mistakes in the lab
has morphed into a broader concern that the mistakes in the lab are the
product of a deeper rationality. This criticism is most clearly embodied
within psychology itself by Gerd Gigerenzer, who argues that the use of
the heuristics represents an "ecologically rationality."43 He contends that
mental shortcuts are the key to human cognitive ability: Simple rules
make us smart." Under this thesis, the reason that human beings use
mental shortcuts is not because we are overwhelmed by information we
cannot process, but because attempting to process all available informa-
tion would lead to mistakes. In the extreme form that Gigerenzer posits,
it is better to use mental shortcuts than to attempt to process all available
information, even if we had the time and cognitive capacity to do so.45
From this perspective, faster is not only more efficient, it is smarter.
41. See Rachlinski, supra note 25, at 1171 (identifying representativeness as one of five common
cognitive processes that pervade BLE).
42. See Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioral Law and Economics, 29
QUEEN'S L.J. 563, 566-68 (2004).
43. See generally, Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive
Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART 3 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. eds., 1999) (discuss-
ing the advantages of relying on heuristics).
44. Id. at 14-15.
45. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Betting on One Good Reason, in SIMPLE
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART, supra note 43, at 75-95.
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According to the theory that heuristics make us smart, reliance on
heuristics must produce few errors in judgment. Even though Giger-
enzer contends that the results Tversky and Kahneman obtained are not
mistakes, it is hard not to admit that certain studies produce errors. In
one study designed to illustrate availability, researchers asked subjects
whether the English language contains more words that have the letter
"k" in the third position or that begin with the letter "k."4 6 Most people
conclude that there are more of the former, even though the language
contains nine times as many words that have the letter k in the third posi-
tion than begin with the letter k.47 That is a mistake-period. Giger-
enzer argues, however, that many studies of this type are highly artificial
and devoid of the social context that we normally encounter. Only a lin-
guist needs to know the answer to the question, and hence this type of
study asks subjects something that they will never truly need to know.
Gigerenzer's arguments have pointed out flaws in some of the core
research in the psychology of judgment and choice. For example, he has
attacked studies that purport to show that people make overconfident
judgments. Overconfidence is a particular problem for someone who be-
lieves that people generally make good judgments, because confidence in
judgment cannot be brushed aside as an unimportant feature of human
judgment (unlike word counts in the English language). An overconfi-
dent person will make numerous mistakes. Gigerenzer argues that re-
searchers have used methodological tricks to obtain results that make
people seem to be overconfident.48 In the typical study of overconfi-
dence, researchers ask subjects to answer a question and then ask them
to assess the probability that they answered the question correctly. Stud-
ies commonly show that subjects overestimate their ability to answer
general knowledge questions. Instead of asking subjects to estimate the
likelihood that they get a single item correct, Gigerenzer asks subjects
how many questions in a set they are likely to have gotten correct. This
method produces estimates that are generally accurate.49 It is odd that
subjects who will say that they are ninety percent confident actually say
that they are only apt to get seven out of ten questions right, but Giger-
enzer contends that the frequency format is more natural and hence facil-
itates better judgment. 0
The idea that people rely on mental processes that produce rational
judgments in realistic settings and only produce deviations from rational-
ity in unnatural settings obviously blunts much of the force of the legal
46. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 4, at 163, 166-
67.
47. See id. at 167.
48. See Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics and
Biases," 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 85 (1991).
49. GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD 158 (2000)
("[J]udgments in the frequency mode are more accurate ... than probabilities for single events.").
50. See id. at 6 (describing frequency formats as more "intuitive").
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reforms that BLE often suggests. Once again, the criticism shows the
vulnerability of BLE to evidence that people make rational judgments.
As with the concern that cognitive mistakes are not mistakes, the
criticisms arising from ecological rationality do not undermine the field.
For one thing, few truly believe that the reliance on heuristics leads to
better judgment in all cases. Indeed, even with respect to overconfi-
dence, the evidence suggests that people make overconfident judgments
in contexts that are highly relevant to important aspects of their lives.
For example, incoming freshmen identify features of a college that they
say are critical to their choice, even though they grossly overestimate the
extent to which of these features will matter to them at the end of one
semester."' For many high school students, their choice of college is the
most important decision they will make in their young lives, and yet they
approach it with notable overconfidence. Gigerenzer's work shows that
overconfidence might be a contextual phenomenon that occurs only in
certain settings. The settings in which overconfidence influences judg-
ment, however, are often important ones.
The research on ecological rationality also largely fails to account
for the dynamic and difficult system in which people make important
judgments. For example, numerous papers in BLE address misleading
advertising or deceptive business practices.52 In these settings, marketers
have incentives to tinker with different ways of displaying their product
so as to induce consumers to use cognitive processes that serve mar-
keters' ends. Even if consumers develop a sensible way of thinking
about these situations, marketers can try a different approach. Further-
more, in many settings people get little to no feedback on the quality of
their choices, making it hard to see how they could develop sensible heu-
ristics. Many important decisions (e.g., college, marriage, and major pur-
chases) are made so infrequently that little chance for learning from ex-
perience exists.
The real message from the heuristics and biases literature is not that
people make mistakes, although that is certainly part of the message.
Rather, the real message is that people develop specific cognitive
processes used to make decisions. These processes can be useful and of-
ten lead to good judgments. But in many important instances, people
pull the wrong cognitive tools out of their adaptive toolboxes. For ex-
ample, instead of treating the Linda problem as one that is easily solved
with deductive logic, they call upon their perception of similarity, which
leads them astray. It may well be that heuristics generally make us smart.
But they also make us vulnerable to error.
51. See David Dunning et al., The Overconfidence Effect in Social Prediction, 58 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 570-74 (1990).
52. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 724-44 (1999) (arguing that manufacturers use advertis-
ing to manipulate consumers).
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Research on judgment and choice that uses the perspective of ecol-
ogical rationality can thus help pinpoint when people are vulnerable to
errors and when they are not. It can also lead to useful ways to facilitate
better judgment. This perspective, however, should not reassure conven-
tional law and economics scholars that cognitive mistakes are not real or
are not pervasive.
B. The Phenomena on Which BLE Relies Are Coherent
Scholars have accused BLE of lacking any underlying theory."
Such critics contend that BLE incorporates a seemingly endless collec-
tion of heuristics, biases, and other foibles of human judgment in an ad
hoc fashion.54 This criticism takes two forms. First, maybe it "takes a
theory to beat a theory," and the underlying psychology needs a coherent
organizing principle-such as rational choice theory-before its tenets
can be accepted as substitutes for rational choice theory. Second, absent
an organizing framework, BLE scholars can cherry-pick from a range of
cognitive phenomena to support whatever policy preference is consistent
with their political views. Both of these are important concerns that are
also best addressed with the underlying psychological research.
The concern over the lack of a coherent theory for BLE is really a
concern that the psychology of judgment and choice lacks a coherent
theory. And it is true that the field does not embrace a broad-based
principle, like rational choice theory, to guide a research program. This
concern, in fact, is partly what motivates some psychologists to embrace
ideas like ecological rationality. Ecological rationality provides a metric
by which to assess the observed cognitive phenomena. Under this ap-
proach, cognitive processes are adaptive mechanisms that facilitated sur-
vival in our ancestral past. Proponents of this approach thus view phe-
nomena that do not appear to have an adaptive function as suspect.
Psychology is not a field that embraces broad-based principles as a
fundamental guide to its research program. Rather, psychology builds up
its principles from observed data. Psychology has embraced omnibus
theories in the past (Skinnerian behaviorism and Freudian psychoanaly-
sis) only to find that they cannot explain sizeable chunks of human be-
havior. Like the hard sciences, its theories are built from the bottom up
and not form the top down. In psychology, one does not beat a theory
with a theory, but one beats a theory with data. When a theory does not
appear to have empirical support, it slowly comes to be rejected and re-
placed by an alternative theory.
In this respect, it is probably better to see economics as the outlier
discipline in embracing a unitary theory. Hard sciences like chemistry,
biology, and physics do not start with a single general prediction about
53. See Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 748-52 (reviewing these criticisms).
54. See id.
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how all molecules, organisms, or bits of matter behave and then derive
empirical claims. Rather, theories are built up that must accommodate
the existing data. No one in physics would ever have sensibly claimed
that Brownian motion was not real merely because it was inconsistent
with Newtonian physics without also admitting that rigorous empirical
testing was the real way to assess whether such a phenomenon was real.
It would be no less strange to assume that people do not suffer from
"framing effects" or hindsight bias merely because these phenomena
seem inconsistent with rational choice.
Psychology, particularly cognitive psychology, is more of a meth-
odology than a theory. Cognitive psychologists hypothesize cognitive
structures in the mind (or brain) that perform identifiable functions that
explain the pattern of behavior that can be observed in the research.
This approach has proven successful because it tracks how the brain ac-
tually works. The brain is increasingly seen as having compartmentalized
sets of functions. A methodological approach that accommodates inter-
nally separate processes that can conflict as they perform different func-
tions is thus consistent with the underlying machinery of the brain.
Furthermore, the psychology of judgment and choice has produced
several consistently observed patterns. People seem to rely on simple
mental shortcuts that are useful but can be overused. These include a
heavy reliance on context to make a choice, particularly the status quo.
Psychologists have also found that it is best to view concepts that econo-
mists think of as entirely fungible (e.g., probability, wealth, and even
money) as having the same kinds of psychophysical properties as ordi-
nary stimuli (e.g., light and temperature). That is, people do not treat
these as entirely fungible and do not consistently treat them as linear
concepts that guide decision making." Psychology does not really benefit
from an overarching theory so long as the observations slowly accumu-
late into a set of reliable generalizations about human judgment and
choice.
The concern with the ad hoc use of cognitive psychology in legal de-
cision making is, however, an important one. Legal scholars are advo-
cates who develop policy preferences that likely arise from their political
views, rather than from the realities of social science. Scholars are thus
apt to use the psychology the way a drunk uses a lamppost-for support,
rather than illumination. The diversity of findings from psychology facil-
itates an ad hoc approach. The findings sometimes conflict with each
other, and it can be difficult to determine which cognitive phenomena
will influence people in which context. Therefore, legal scholars and ad-
vocates can commonly find phenomena within psychology to support
their arguments with no apparent limitations.
55. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 286 (1979).
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The use of science as advocacy is a sin of legal scholarship in gener-
al, however, and is not unique to psychology. Legal scholars take the
same approach with economics, history, philosophy, sociology, or any
convenient source of support. The accuracy of these policy points will, in
the long run, depend on whether the point that the legal scholar makes is
truly faithful to the underlying research in psychology and whether em-
pirical support for it can be found in the legal context. The same is true
of economics and other social sciences. The presence of a unifying
theory has not precluded the ad hoc use of any field of research to sup-
port advocacy.
C. The Phenomena on Which BLE Relies Persist in the Face of
Incentives and in Institutions
Would cognitive errors disappear only if the incentives were high
enough? Do these errors persist in institutional settings? One might
suppose that research subjects given no incentive to answer the Linda
problem properly cannot be expected to deploy the same level of cogni-
tive effort as they might if their jobs, fortunes, or lives depended on it.
Psychologists studying judgment and choice, however, have assessed the
thesis that incentives would make the phenomena that they study disap-
pear in detail. Generally speaking, they have rejected the idea that their
research is the product of the lack of sufficient motivation by their sub-
jects.56 Incentives can influence judgment and choice, but they are no
panacea for good judgment. "Incentives do not operate by magic: they
work by focusing attention and by prolonging deliberation."" When the
error is the product of an illusion of judgment of which people are not
aware, they follow the illusion all the more strongly.
Institutional settings can reduce errors in judgment, and this con-
cern is a more serious criticism. Psychologists rarely study institutional
settings even though most choices are made within an institutional
framework. Institutional settings that reward good judgment (e.g., highly
fluid financial markets) can weed out those who rely on erroneous strat-
egies or rearrange the decision-making context in order to ensure that
their decision makers have a better context for making choices.18 Institu-
56. See Eldar Shafir & Robyn A. LeBoeuf, Rationality, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 491, 500-07
(2002) (reviewing these criticisms outside of the legal context); see also Colin F. Camerer & Robin M.
Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production
Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 33 (1999) ("There is no replicated study in which a theory
of rational choice was rejected at low stakes ... and accepted at high stakes." (emphasis omitted));
David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 1533, 1537-39 (2001) (describing
how cognitive errors among investors survive in market environments).
57. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J.
Bus. S251, S274 (1986).
58. See Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for
Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 14, 30 (1998).
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tions can also require accountability, which reduces some (but by no
means all) cognitive errors. 9
Institutional frameworks, however, are also not a cure-all for bad
judgment. The strategies that institutions can use to produce good judg-
ment are costly. These strategies commonly involve hiring expensive ex-
perts or dividing up decisions between different groups. Also, institu-
tions require self-conscious restructuring to improve their decisions. In-
Institutions might lack feedback that would signal that they need to alter
their decision-making strategies -feedback that might be hard or even
impossible to obtain. Institutional settings can also make judgment
worse by producing groupthink or incentives structures that send bad in-
formation up the chain of command.60
Furthermore, even if some institutional settings can improve judg-
ment, a sensible legal system would recognize that many important deci-
sions are not made in institutional settings. Decisions by consumers,
judges, and juries are not necessarily made with the kind of institutional
framework that can improve judgment. The role of incentives and insti-
tutions is thus important but only deepens the project of BLE, it does not
undermine it.
IV. THE PARADOX OF BLE
More significant than all of these criticisms, however, is a concern
that none of the critics have expressed directly. Most of the criticisms, in
one way or another, contend that BLE has gone too far in departing
from the rational choice model of human judgment. A more serious
concern, however, is that BLE has not gone far enough. BLE is still law
and economics; it does not reject the basic foundations of economics.
Even though the psychological origins of BLE are firmly inconsistent
with many of the basic tenets of economics, the model for BLE remains
that of law and economics. This represents a paradox that is difficult to
resolve.
Two important implications of psychology are particularly challeng-
ing for BLE to accommodate, because they seem fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the methodological commitments of law itself: situationism and
the psychology of hedonic value. Situationism is that strain of social psy-
chology that suggests that human behavior is commonly the product of
the situations in which people find themselves, more so than their own
underlying personalities.6 By contrast, law tends to assume people are
responsible for their own conduct. Hedonic psychology refers to those
59. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255, 258 (1999).
60. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harm), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 138 (1997).
61. See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECrIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 8-11 (1991) (describing "situationism").
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aspects of the psychology of judgment and choice that suggest that
people do not truly know what they value. By contrast, law assumes that
people carry stable preferences that they access when making decisions.
Professor Korobkin's fine article in this volume takes on the role of
hedonics.62 1 will therefore confine my discussion to that of situationism.
But suffice it to say, the idea that people fundamentally misunderstand
what they value would be a deeply serious problem for any legal system
such as ours, which is founded upon the primacy of autonomy and indi-
vidual choice. Preserving personal autonomy within a legal system has
inherent value, but it is also valuable on utilitarian grounds because free
choice will mean that people get what they want. If people do not know
what they want, then what function does autonomy serve? And what
goal should law serve if not personal autonomy? Professor Korobkin
tackles these difficult questions, but they show how difficult reconciling
psychology and law can be when one takes the psychological work to its
full logical implications.
Situationism is just as difficult to reconcile with law. The research
from psychology suggests that people in Western cultures tend to under-
estimate the extent to which the behavior of others is a product of the
situation in which they find themselves. 63 Instead, we carry a strong ten-
dency to attribute behavior to stable and dispositional traits. This con-
clusion is one of the fundamental principles of social psychology. Social
psychologist Lee Ross outlined this basic observation decades ago and
termed it the "fundamental attribution error" (FAE)." The moniker
remains, but it is more than just an error. The FAE is so pervasive and
ingrained that it can hardly be called a mere cognitive error that gets
made in only limited contexts. Rather, this concept is an organizing prin-
ciple of social psychological theory.
Psychologists have marshaled a great deal of evidence to support
the concept of the FAE.5 As one example of this research, people fail to
appreciate even the most obvious of situational controls that govern their
behavior. In one experiment demonstrating this phenomenon, in which
people were paid to write essays either supporting or opposing the gov-
ernment of Fidel Castro, observers who read the essays rated the writers
of the pro-Castro essays as more pro-Castro than they rated the writers
of the anti-Castro essays.66 This occurred even though the participants
62. Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1653.
63. See Ross & NISBET,supra note 61, at 184-86.
64. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed.,
1977).
65. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Charac-
ter, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) (reviewing
this literature).
66. See Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 8-10 (1967).
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knew that the writers were paid for the content and even though they
knew that the writers were randomly assigned to the position."7
Similarly, in a study critical to the work of Socratic-style law profes-
sors everywhere, Lee Ross and his students showed that people fail to
see the importance of role when assessing others' intelligence. In his
"quiz bowl" study, Ross randomly assigned students to the role of either
questioner or contestant.68 Ross found that when asked to assess the in-
telligence of the parties, questioners, contestants, and observers all con-
cluded that the questioners were more intelligent.69 After all, the ques-
tioners had all the answers while the contestants were often stumped.
Random assignment ensured that the contest could reveal little about the
relative intelligence of the questioner and the contestant, but all involved
failed to appreciate this. The random selection faded into the back-
ground, leaving the observers to attribute the behavior of the parties to
some sense of their native intelligence.
Stanley Milgram and Phil Zimbardo have provided some of the
most dramatic evidence of the FAE. Milgram induced subjects in his ex-
periment to deliver what appeared to them to be painful electrical shocks
to an innocent victim. 0 Subtle aspects of the situation induced the con-
duct, and most subjects continued to deliver the shocks long after the vic-
tim began a series of agonized screams." Similarly, Zimbardo induced
ordinary college students in Palo Alto, California to become sadistic
guards in a simulated prison." What makes this research surprising to
most of us is that we fail to appreciate the power of the situation in guid-
ing conduct. We assume that only sadistic, twisted individuals would be-
have as the subjects in these experiments behave. And yet we know that
the participants were ordinary people. The experiments teach us about
human nature, but only because we already lack a basic understanding of
human nature. If our attention were focused on the situational cues that
induce behavior, these studies might be interesting, but their results
would not be so surprising.
What does the FAE mean for BLE? Some have applied the FAE in
fairly straightforward ways, arguing that the failure to appreciate the
power of the situation shows how dangerous character evidence is at tri-
al.73 People tend to assume that criminals committed their acts precisely
because of their bad conduct and not because of the circumstances in
67. See id. at 9-10.
68. Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and
Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES, supra note 4, at 129, 136-38 (describing this research).
69. See id.
70. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 20-29 (1974).
71. See id.
72. See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING How GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007) (describing the study).
73. See Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1227, 1231-32, 1306 (2001).
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which they find themselves. Hence, admitting testimony of past crimes
against defendants poses two problems. First, it risks unduly prejudicing
the jury against the defendant. Second, it prolongs the punishment of
criminal offender by continually holding the past acts against him or her
in legal proceedings. This application of the FAE is similar to traditional
applications of psychology to law. That is, it identifies a bias in judgment
and the legal rule (or reform) that it supports.
But the FAE feels like a more potent phenomenon with broader
applications. The bias represents a widespread misunderstanding of how
society functions, so surely it has applications beyond a single rule of evi-
dence. The whole legal system is a product of how people think about
fault and responsibility. So if the basic perceptions of the population in-
clude this fundamental mistake, then surely the legal system itself incor-
porates this misguided thinking.7 4
Direct empirical evidence that the FAE has produced a badly
skewed legal system is difficult to come by, however. Revealing the
faults in the system requires a good deal of psychological perspective on
law and society. A person who commits the FAE might be unable to see
its effects in the system; indeed, that is precisely how the system came to
carry the error. For example, consider the question of how to respond to
those who are convicted of dealing drugs. We naturally blame the drug
dealer and send him or her to prison-often under dreadful conditions
and for a lengthy term. But if we believe Milgram and Zimbardo, then
the criminal might suffer from bad circumstances more than bad charac-
ter. Growing up poor in a tough urban neighborhood itself is not a
crime; it is an accident of fate. Similarly, having the misfortune of meet-
ing older drug dealers or admiring the lives lived by some of the more
successful dealers are not crimes, especially in a neighborhood where
more wholesome role models tend to move away. At some point, the
dealer crosses a line and breaks the law, and certainly not every poor ur-
ban kid with an unfortunate set of friends turns to crime. Similarly, not
every guard in Zimbardo's prison study was sadistic, and not every sub-
ject in Milgram's research gave the most severe shocks. Praising those
who resist the power of the situation in which they find themselves, how-
ever, should not necessarily lead us to condemn those (in some cases the
majority) who succumb to the situational influences. Under other cir-
cumstances, people who face bad circumstances might have never en-
gaged in criminal conduct. To be sure, this simplifies a complex argu-
ment, and many would not agree that people should be excused because
of their circumstances. The extreme punishment meted out to drug deal-
ers and many other types of criminals nevertheless grates on most social
psychologists, who see the underappreciated influence that bad circum-
stances can have on behavior.
74. See Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal Theory
and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2003).
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To justify the severe punishment of imprisonment, the legal system
relies heavily on moral blame.15 The actors sent there must be bad, not
merely unfortunate. In fact, most adults blame criminals for their crimes.
The legal system assumes that bad character and not bad luck plays a
critical role in crime precisely because most people believe it. Evidence
from sociologists and criminologists concerning the correlates of crime is
widely known to the general public, but this evidence is either dismissed
or rationalized away. The FAE might play a powerful role in the public's
rejection of the evidence and its embrace of a highly punitive system.
The system we have rests on blaming criminals for their conduct, and as a
society, we have no problem doing exactly that.
The influence of the FAE likely goes further than the criminal jus-
tice system. As Jon Hanson and some of his students have argued, the
torts system also relies on assigning blame."6 Hanson worries that tort
plaintiffs bear the brunt of the FAE in the civil justice system. Despite
public perceptions that tort plaintiffs run amuck in the legal system, their
efforts to ascribe fault to manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies
face a range of hurdles that lead the system to blame them for their own
misfortunes. Smokers are blamed for getting lung cancer because they
ignored warnings, fat people are blamed for eating too much and failing
to diet, and all manner of risk activity is blamed primarily on the actor
who gets injured. To most people, this seems to be a just outcome. But
is it the FAE at work again? After all, manufacturers of cigarettes, fast-
food companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and others control the
environment in which people make choices. In the end, who is responsi-
ble for the sadistic behavior of the guards in Zimbardo's prison experi-
ment-the unwitting students who were brought in and encouraged to be
brutal or Zimbardo himself for setting up the circumstances that pro-
duced the brutality? The FAE hides the background environment that
produces smokers, fat people, and severe injuries, even though this envi-
ronment is produced precisely by the marketers and manufacturers who
sell these products. Marketers and manufacturers might be said to have
just as much control over the environment that Zimbardo had over the
prison guards. And when judges or jurors see the smoker, the environ-
ment remains hidden. And once again, when plaintiffs' lawyers bear the
brunt of reforms instead of tobacco companies, most citizens fail to see
the trap that tobacco companies laid for smokers and blame plaintiffs'
lawyers for stirring up trouble.
Jon Hanson goes one step further with his analysis, however.77 He
argues that large companies benefit heavily from the FAE, and he finds
it a repugnant, unfortunate aspect of modern society. Hanson goes fur-
75. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Crim-
inal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 1002 (2003).
76. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 65, at 242-45 (discussing the role of social psychological
biases in the assignment of blame in tort law).
77. See, e.g., id. at 266-68.
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ther, however, than to condemn the system that blames individuals, even
when corporate entities set the stage for their misfortune. But for him,
yet another shoe drops. He asserts that large companies are also respon-
sible for the FAE.8 They pitch individualism along with their products.
The Marlboro Man is his case in point. Not only does the admirable,
rugged individualist in the ad campaign smoke-he is an admirable,
rugged individualist! He represents an effort both to convince the public
both to smoke and to embrace individualism. Thus, even as they sell
their products, the tobacco manufacturers erect their defense against liti-
gation. They plant seeds that grow into the FAE, thereby poisoning the
jury pool (and presumably the voters) against their victims and under-
mining the attitudes that would otherwise promote legislative reform.79
The comparative influence of individual differences and the power
of social situations can be described in two different ways. First is "weak
situationism," which refers simply to the underappreciation of the impor-
tance of social situations in determining individual behavior. Second is
"strong situationism," which refers to the belief that not only do people
underappreciate the power of the situation, but also that the situation is,
in fact, a much more important determinant of behavior than individual
variations. Jon Hanson calls his view that business interests perpetuate
the FAE "deep capture."" The social science evidence can be said to
reasonably support weak situationism. It is unclear whether strong situa-
tionism can be coherently tested. Determining whether personality or
situations are more potent determinants of behavior in a world in which
many people chose what situations they encounter is challenging. Fur-
thermore, while it is obvious that being born in rural India likely produc-
es a radically different life than growing up in suburban Chicago, differ-
ent personalities in both settings also seem to arise. Hanson's ideas on
deep capture go beyond empirical evidence to stand or fall as a rhetorical
perspective, more so than as social science. Even though one can find
examples of advertisements that reflect individualism, it is not obvious
whether such advertisements create an attitude or take advantage of one
that exists for other reasons. Furthermore, for every advertisement that
suggests individualism, one also likely finds advertisements that promote
community ethics.
Which kind of situationism provides the right approach to legal
problems is a challenge to BLE. The easy path is, of course, weak situa-
tionism. Accepting that the FAE means weak situationism allows BLE
scholars to advocate some mild tinkering with the legal system, such as
the scholarship on the FAE and evidentiary rules. Strong situationism,
in contrast, undermines the basic model of human behavior that our legal
78. See id.
79. There is a lot that is wrong with this argument-which will have to await another place and
another time.
80. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 65, at 202.
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system entails. In so doing, strong situationism risks incoherence be-
cause of its fundamental incompatibility with the central role that assign-
ing blame plays in our legal system.
What would strong situationism mean for the legal system? This is
the challenge for BLE. If we accept the argument that our core beliefs
about how society works are wrong, then what else must we give up?
Can we ever punish a criminal defendant? Must we embrace enterprise
liability? These are unlikely trends in any near future, making this a hard
road for BLE to travel.
V. CONCLUSION
The future of BLE is yet to be written. Much like law and econom-
ics, BLE has embedded itself within the firmament of legal scholarship.
Numerous standard-cite references are finding their way into the first-
year casebooks in law schools, ensuring that the next generation of law-
yers will be mindful of this line of work, just as the last generation be-
came mindful of law and economics. Criticism is inevitable and helpful,
as it sharpens the field. Because the criticism fails to undermine the un-
derlying psychological research, it will not truly undermine the field.
Ironically, the real difficulty BLE faces lies in its embrace of psychologi-
cal principles that are incredibly difficult to square with the fundamental
assumptions of the legal system. For the foreseeable future, the field will
remain a paradox.
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